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Hypothetical Art and Art Education: The Educational 
Role of the Method of Hypothetical Artwork Modelling 
Jurij Selan1
  A hypothetical artwork is an artwork that exists only as a fictional crea-
tion of an art theorist. The explicatory powers of such hypothetical art-
works are mainly used by an art theorist to reflect on an art theoretical 
issue under consideration. Such an artwork has an intriguing and para-
doxical nature. On the one hand, it is only fictitious, but, on the other 
hand, it tries to function as a real token, persuading the reader to trust it 
as if it were a real artwork. Even though this kind of argumentation can 
be deceiving, as it presents a statement of real art on the basis of fiction, 
it has some important explicatory abilities that can be put to good use 
in the art educational process. In this case, the construction of the hy-
pothetical artwork is handled as the construction of a theoretical model. 
The author calls such theoretical construction the method of hypothetical 
artwork modelling, and its result the hypothetical artwork model. Such a 
hypothetical artwork model can be usefully employed when one wishes 
to encourage the student to become fictionally involved in the process 
of creation of an artwork, thus giving him or her more personal experi-
ence of problems that accompany the process of creating a real artwork. 
When such hypothetical experience is gained, the student can more ef-
ficiently learn about the considered art issue. In the paper, the author 
demonstrates how the explicatory powers of the method of hypothetical 
artwork modelling can be put into educational practice regarding an is-
sue taken from colour theory (i.e., the primary colours fallacy).
 Keywords: Art education, Art theory, Colour theory, Hypothetical art, 
Models, Primary colours
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Introduction: The Curious World of Hypothetical Art
A hypothetical artwork is an artwork that exists only as a fictional crea-
tion of an art theorist (Selan, 2008, 2010). Usually it is introduced into the text 
by the linguistic assertion of supposition; for example, by the use of syntagms: 
»let us suppose, imagine that, etc.« Since the hypothetical artwork has no life 
outside the hypothetical world of a particular art theory, its intention is not to 
fascinate but to explicate. Therefore, the explicatory powers of hypothetical art 
are used by an art theorist mainly to reflect on a particular art theoretical is-
sue under consideration and to verify certain stated art theoretical claims. One 
such famous hypothetical artwork is, for instance, Picasso’s Le Cravat, which 
was invented by art theorist Arthur C. Danto (1981, p. 40).
However, a hypothetical artwork has an intriguing and paradoxical na-
ture, which can be demonstrated as follows.
For a thing to be an artwork, two criteria that we routinely take for 
granted must be met. The first is the criterion of reality, which postulates two 
kinds of reality. On the one hand, the reality of facture: we believe that an art-
work must be manufactured as a sensual artefact.2 On the other hand, there is 
the reality of place: an artwork must also be accepted by some cultural context 
(i.e., artworld) that evaluates it as an artwork.
This first criterion further implies the second: an artwork’s reality must 
be an outcome of two modes of experience that come in a certain natural order. 
An artwork must first be created by an artist. Only later can an interpretation 
follow, which places it in the artworld.
If something does not meet these criteria then it is not an artwork and 
can find no place in any kind of art history. So, which are the »things« that do 
not succumb to these criteria?
First, let me take as an example the ordinary stone. We obviously do 
not treat it as an artwork and no art histories would document it as such. Even 
though it has a facture, it is not properly created; and even though it has a natu-
ral place, it is not socially placed, for it lacks a proper interpretation. In brief, it 
is, as Arthur C. Danto (1981, pp. 1-33) would say, just a »mere real thing.« How-
ever, as 20th century art showed us, such a mere thing can actually at some point 
be accepted as an artwork, but only if properly transformed into a readymade.
2  Of course, I am not suggesting that all art concerns the manufacturing of material objects (e.g., 
performance art, conceptual art, body art, digital art, etc.). However, I want to stress that all art 
has to be presented in some kind of medium. Therefore, I use terms »facture« and »artefact,« 
(Latin: »facere« = ‘make, create’), to accentuate this creational aspect that all artworks share.c e p s  Journal | Vol.1 | No2 | Year 2011 61
But what about a »thing« such as a hypothetical artwork? Could it be 
documented by some art anthology, such as that of David Summers (2003), 
where he precisely states the two categories of the artwork’s reality: the facture 
and the place? No, for it lacks something that we all generally expect a real art-
work to have. If a stone mostly lacks a proper interpretation and is thus a »mere 
thing,« a hypothetical artwork is only a fiction having no life outside its theory. 
Thus, it obviously lacks a facture and a proper creation, consisting only of an 
interpretation, and can for that reason be called, paraphrasing Danto’s own ex-
pression, a »mere no-thing.«
When such a mere no-thing is used in the deliberation of a particular art 
issue and in the argumentation of a stated art thesis it inevitably faces a paradox. 
On the one hand, it is only fictitious, but, on the other hand, it tries to function as 
a real token, persuading the reader to trust it as if it were a real artwork. Despite 
being fictitious, a »mere no-thing« has an intention to be taken as real.
It is precisely in this paradoxical nature that both the explicatory abilities 
and the limits of hypothetical artworks originate.
When an art theorist wants to address a particular art theoretical issue 
by constructing a hypothetical artwork, he or she must do so in a process of ar-
gumentation that is sufficiently logical to make the reader trust the constructed 
hypothetical artwork with the same certitude as if it were a real artwork. Such 
a process has two levels: inductive and deductive. Firstly, a hypothetical artwork 
must be established as a piece of evidence such as a real artwork would nor-
mally be. In order to do this, the art theorist must convince the reader that the 
constructed hypothetical artwork corresponds to the criteria to which real art-
works spontaneously correspond. Since it is the real facture and the real artistic 
process that a hypothetical artwork critically lacks, the art theorist must simu-
late a creative process that could lead to the suggested artwork and its facture 
in reality. When the reader is convinced in this sense the hypothetical artwork 
can be taken as a valid piece of evidence in the argumentation of art problems 
that exist in reality.
Only when this is achieved can the hypothetical artwork enter the sec-
ond level, where it is involved in a process of so-called (inductive) generalisa-
tion. In this process, the art theorist tries to argue that the thesis proved by some 
hypothetical artworks is generally valid for all artworks in history.
However, the problem is that such argumentation can go wrong—just as 
any kind of argumentation based on fiction can. Logical fallacies can appear at 
any of the two levels. I will try to demonstrate this with an example.
When on the first level of argumentation a hypothetical artwork is es-
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ways. Arthur Danto’s book The Transfiguration of the Commonplace is full of 
such ways. Let me just consider the following one (Danto, 1981, p. 31): »Imag-
ine that we learned that the object before us, looks like a painting that would 
spontaneously move us if we believed it had been painted—say the Polish Rider 
of Rembrandt, in which an isolated mounted figure is shown midjourney to an 
uncertain destiny—was not painted at all but is the result of someone’s having 
dumped lots of paint in a centrifuge, giving the contrivance of a spin, and hav-
ing the result splat on canvas, ‘just to see what would happen’.« 
This hypothetical artwork can be called the Polish Rider Made in a Cen-
trifuge. The Polish Rider actually exists as an artefact. However, Danto trans-
forms it into the hypothetical artwork by making speculations about how it 
could be created. So, by suggesting that the Polish Rider could also be made in 
a centrifuge, Danto tries to prove his basic thesis, which states: the facture of 
Polish Rider has no role in defining its artwork status; therefore, its entire value 
is defined exclusively by the social context or so called artworld.
However, such hypothetical artwork simulation does not convince me. 
Why? If I consider the daring hypothetical process that according to Danto 
could lead to the facture of the Polish Rider I cannot trust it. Just think about the 
actual possibility that the facture of the Polish Rider would be made in a centri-
fuge! It just does not seem plausible. Of course, some artworks—like those by 
Jackson Pollock or some brownish spills by Morris Louis—could more likely be 
made in a centrifuge. However, that only tells me that one cannot put factures 
of all artworks to the same denominator. Subsequently, from the point of view 
of reality, I cannot consider the Polish Rider Made in a Centrifuge as a piece of 
evidence that could properly justify Danto’s argument, since it is impossible for 
it to really be made that way.
However, there is another problem that a hypothetical artwork can face 
in such argumentation. This problem is linked to the second level of the logical 
inference by (inductive) generalisation. Here the Polish Rider Made in a Centri-
fuge faces another logical issue.
Let us ask ourselves why Danto chose to ascribe the »centrifugal facture« 
to one of Rembrandt’s artworks and not one by Morris Louis, which would have 
been better suited.
Danto’s main intention is to generalise his basic thesis to all artworks 
in history. This generalised thesis states: the status of each and every artwork 
does not originate from its facture, which is thus irrelevant, but from the in-
terpretation that locates an artwork in the proper place, called the »artworld« 
(Danto, 1981, pp. 124-126). However, real artworks (e.g., Duchamp’s Fountain 
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of generalisation. Because they belong to a narrow group of artworks that we 
usually denominate as »post-Duchampian«, they cannot inductively generalise 
Danto’s thesis to all art.3 If Danto had made the inductive generalisation based 
only on post-Duchampian artworks this would have led him to the fallacy of 
hasty generalisation, which is a corollary of making inductive generalisations 
based on a range of evidence that is too narrow (Gardiner, 2008, pp. 139-140).
Thus, if Danto had wanted to prove his thesis for all art he would have 
had to resolve the problem of »too hasty generalisation.« This is precisely the 
intention of the Polish Rider Made in a Centrifuge: it enables Danto to also ver-
ify his thesis for the art of Rembrandt’s time and subsequently expand the his-
torical span of evidence to facilitate the logically valid inductive generalisation 
regarding all artworks in history.
However, as it seems to me, this does not work either. By constructing 
such a hypothetical artwork Danto only apparently avoids »too hasty gener-
alisation«, while in fact making »too hasty generalisation« implicitly. When he 
constructs the Polish Rider Made in a Centrifuge he is already presupposing 
what he is only trying to prove: the general validity of his thesis for all art. This, 
however, leads such argumentation to the fallacy of circular argument, which 
presumes the truth of what is to be proved (Gensler & Gensler, 2002, p. 328). 
Danto already takes for granted that which he is only trying to generalise by 
the Polish Rider Made in a Centrifuge. Otherwise, he would not construct a 
hypothetical artwork—one that is so obviously implausible in reality —in the 
first place.
Hypothetical Artworks as Valid Models: 
The Method of Hypothetical Artwork Modelling
The logical issues that I came across when reflecting on the Polish Rider 
Made in a Centrifuge made me recognise the cardinal problem that the hypo-
thetical artwork must resolve in order to be taken as a valid piece of evidence: it 
must somehow submit to the criteria of good scientific argumentation.
As we all know, it is common and legitimate in serious science to use 
»mere no-things« to argue about certain scientific problems. However, it is 
3  An inductive judgment is imperfect because it is based on a finite number of empirical pieces 
of evidence. However, when a wide enough repertoire of evidence is available to us we usually 
transform inductions into deductions by making inductive generalisations. In this sense, we have 
no doubt that the sun will raise tomorrow, even though we cannot be completely certain, as 
David Hume (1986, p. 20) once famously argued.64 hypothetical art and art education
important that in scientific argumentation such theoretically constructed mere 
no-things fulfil the essential criteria needed to construct something that logi-
cians call a valid argument (Gamut, 1991, pp. 1-4). To simplify, two conditions 
are needed for a good argument: first, its premises have to be verified and ac-
cepted as true; and second, these premises must be further developed into a 
conclusion without digressing into logical fallacies.
In science, a premise or piece of evidence is accepted as true when it 
meets the condition of empirical verification in the reality of »our world«. So, 
when some pure theoretical constructions (»mere no-things«) are suggested as 
true they must also succumb to such verification. When they do, they become 
what the philosophy of science considers as theoretical models. In modal logic, 
such models are also understood as possible objects in possible worlds (Chellas, 
1980, pp. 34-38). If an object presupposed in some possible world is to be right-
fully considered as possible in our world too it must be established in accord-
ance with the natural order of our world. That is, presuppositions of a possible 
world where a hypothetical artwork is constructed as a virtual piece of evidence 
must correspond to experiences in our world. Only when they do so can the 
constructed hypothetical artwork also be convincingly applied to a particular 
art issue in our world. So, we accept hypothetical artworks as valid models, and 
thus as true pieces of evidence, only if we can verify them in the reality of our 
world; if we cannot do so we reject them as invalid models and thus as untrue 
pieces of evidence.
As one can easily discover, it is precisely the verifiability of a possible ob-
ject in the reality of our world that further prevents argumentation from getting 
into logical fallacies, such as the fallacy of circular argument. When an argu-
ment is circular, it is because its premises cannot be proven outside the possible 
world of the theory within which they were constructed.
From a scientific point of view, the Polish Rider Made in a Centrifuge is 
then nothing but an invalid model, because one cannot acknowledge the possible 
world in which it could be made as being compatible with our world. Therefore, 
if we wish to make good use of the explicatory powers of hypothetical art we must 
use it according to the criteria of good or valid argumentation. When it is done 
so, I call such theoretical construction of a hypothetical artwork the method of 
hypothetical artwork modelling and its result the hypothetical artwork model.
In the continuation of the article I will try to exemplify how hypotheti-
cal artworks can be constructed as valid models and subsequently also be put to 
good use in art education. The issue with regard to which I will explore the educa-
tional usefulness of the method of hypothetical artwork modelling is taken from 
colour theory and can be called the painters’ primary colours fallacy (Selan, 2010).c e p s  Journal | Vol.1 | No2 | Year 2011 65
An Example from Colour Theory: 
The Case of the Painters’ Primary Colours Fallacy
Painters traditionally considered red, yellow and blue (RYB) as primary 
colours, until on the grounds of physical and physiological discoveries in 19th 
century it was proven that subtractive primary colours are actually cyan, magen-
ta and yellow (CMY). However, whereas scientific colour theories took these 
new discoveries into account, artistic colour theories, such as those of Johannes 
Itten (1961) and Joseph Albers (1963), did not, which is why these theories were 
much criticised. Alan Lee, for instance, emphasised that it is excusable for Goe-
the (1840) not to accurately define primary colours since there was no exact 
knowledge back then on this matter, but that it is inexcusable for Albers and 
Itten not to have done so (Arnheim & Lee, 1982).
My concern here is whether this kind of criticism regarding artistic col-
our theories is legitimate. I believe that it is inspired by the division that many 
scientific colour theorists, such as Harald Kueppers, insist on following when 
teaching about colour. They insist on the strict separation of colour theory, as 
a universally true science based on physical and physiological laws, from the 
history of colour theory and its incorrect scientific solutions, despite their expe-
riential and cultural values (Kueppers, 2008).
Even though making such a distinction is generally necessary for valid 
scientific research, it seems to me that if we cling to it too strictly when teaching 
about colour this could lead us to some intolerable anomalies.
For instance, when Alan Lee criticised Albers’s Interaction of Colour 
based on its theoretical fallacies he also put Albers’ work as an artist under 
question (Lee, 1981). This, however, feels to me like an anomaly in argumenta-
tion, for one can at the same time learn a lot from the ingenious colour struc-
tures in Albers’ work and, as Dorothea Jameson (1983) prudently replied to Lee, 
be aware of his theoretical fallacies.
Jonathan C. Fish (1981), for example, also criticised artistic colour theories 
and their primary colours fallacy. However, when he recognised that Piet Mondrian 
used the wrong primaries in his artistic work, he, unlike Lee, did not disprove the 
value of his art on that basis. »Turner and Mondrian succeeded superbly in their use 
of colour, despite their incorrect assumption,« he wrote (Fish, 1981, p. 91).
It was precisely the stated dilemma regarding artistic colour theories and 
their treatment of primary colours that stimulated me to reflect on the matter 
of the painters’ primary colours fallacy more thoroughly. To do so, I used the 
method of hypothetical artwork modelling, by which I constructed the next two 
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Hypothetical Mondrian, Composition with Cyan, Magenta 
and Yellow 
Below is the first hypothetical artwork.
Presuppose, for example, the style of Piet Mondrian. To do so, one must 
decipher the »anatomy« of his real work (Kirsch & Kirsch, 1988). He preferred 
vertical and horizontal lines, primary colours plus black and white, and golden 
section divisions for defining composition.
Now let me suppose one of his paintings. Because the issue I am con-
cerned with is whether the primaries Mondrian used are right or wrong, I 
should give the hypothetical painting the working title Composition with x, y, 
z, where x, y, z stand for primary colours that are not yet defined but under 
consideration.
In the process of modelling hypothetical Mondrian I am then at some 
point forced to make a decision as to which x, y, z I should choose in order to 
get the best artwork.
Presumably following Lee, if one were hypothetically in the place of 
Mondrian one should decide on purely theoretical grounds and choose CMY 
primary colours. In this way one would get Composition with Cyan, Magenta 
and Yellow, or, for example, in the case of his famous Broadway Boogie Woogie, 
Broadway Boogie Woogie in Cyan, Magenta and Yellow.
However, as we know, the real Mondrian made a theoretical fallacy and 
chose RYB primaries instead, thus getting the theoretically wrong Composition 
with Red, Yellow and Blue and the Broadway Boogie Woogie as it is.
I should then ask myself: »What could justify such a decision by 
Mondrian?«
Could it be the recognition that the result of choosing theoretically cor-
rect CMY primaries would feel »wrong,« having a similar effect as neon art, and 
that RYB primaries would feel better?
If so, what is it that feels wrong about Composition with Cyan, Magenta 
and Yellow? Is it perhaps the wrong »moral« value of the CMY colour chord, as 
Goethe would probably claim? Let me compare, for example, the primary blues 
of CMY and RYB chords. The correct subtractive primary blue is cyan; his-
torical review, however, shows us that painters traditionally treated the wrong 
ultramarine and cobalt blue as primary. Cyan blue is theoretically perfect for 
mixing, but in itself feels kind of superficial, electric and shallow, and has little 
cultural value. On the other hand, ultramarine and cobalt blue are incorrect 
as subtractive primaries, but what probably mattered to Mondrian is that they 
have more experiential deepness and therefore more exceptional spiritual and 
cultural significance than cyan. So the need for the right »moral« value of the c e p s  Journal | Vol.1 | No2 | Year 2011 67
colour chord would obviously make Mondrian prefer a historical choice of RYB 
primaries to the theoretical choice of CMY primaries.
The art educational value of the first hypothetical artwork comes for-
ward instantly. Namely, while modelling a hypothetical Mondrian, a student of 
art can experience and subsequently recognise that the »right« choice of paint-
ers’ primaries should not be subordinated only to the theoretical exactness of 
colour mixing, but should be also determined in relation to the historical tradi-
tion of colour usage and its experientially developed symbolism.
Hypothetical Rembrandt, Double Self-Portrait, Colour 
Aquatint, Oil on Canvas 
The first hypothetical artwork model helped me transfer the accentua-
tion from colour as a purely abstract entity in science to colour as the paint of 
cultural value in art. This, however, led me to construct a second hypothetical 
artwork.
Imagine that Rembrandt had both a painting enterprise and a colour 
printing enterprise. Now, let me suppose that he decided to create a diptych, 
which he would call Double Self-Portrait, made up of two identical pictures in 
terms of colour, differentiated only in the process of their facture, the first be-
ing made as a colour print and the second as a handmade oil painting. Given 
the framework of technological development of that time, Rembrandt would 
certainly have to do printing in etchings, maybe even aquatints, which was then 
being developed in the Netherlands (MoMA, 2008).
Concerning the issue of the primary colours fallacy, the next questions 
arise regarding the two presupposed hypothetical Rembrandts: Which primary 
colours would Rembrandt have to choose to get the identical result in both 
pictures of the diptych in terms of colour? Would these colours have to be the 
same? If not, why not?
Both for printers and painters, the question of primary colours was al-
ways concerned with the dilemma as to which pigments are actual material 
equivalents of primary colours. However, despite the fact that the interest of 
printers and painters in this matter appeared to be the same, primary colours 
fulfilled significantly different functions for each group.
A printer’s aim is the complete colour prevision of an image and its in-
finite colour reproducibility; therefore, the printer must resolve two crucial 
problems regarding primary colours. Firstly, the function of printers’ prima-
ries must follow the strict axiomatic logic of colour mixing: as few as possible 
basic colours must intermix in all possible colour perceptions in an absolutely 
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primary colours must result in minimal spectral defects;4 if not, the actual mix-
ing of material pigments will not match the abstract axiomatic logic of colour 
mixing.
The first prints produced by J. C. Le Blon around 1738 show us that at the 
time the choice of pigments was based on RYB primaries. Pigments like Prus-
sian blue and dark yellow lake were used, and for red a mixture of madder-lake, 
carmine and cinnabar. As it turned out, these pigments did not match the rig-
orousness of printers’ primaries, for the printing result was rather poor (Gage, 
1993, p. 162, 169, 216, 221-226). Of course, we know today that pigment equiva-
lents of CMY primaries are needed to fulfil the function of printers’ primaries, 
and not of RYB primaries. Thus, in his time, Rembrandt would have had no 
chance of making a colour print of the desired quality because the knowledge of 
exact printers’ primaries was not properly developed until 19th century.
Therefore, the first educational lesson of the presupposed hypothetical 
Rembrandt is related to the issue of the function of printers’ primary colours. 
While modelling the hypothetical Rembrandt, a student of art can learn that 
without exact primaries and corresponding pigments successful colour print-
ing could not have been developed. Thus, for printers the discovery of the 
principles of colour mixing and of synthetic colour pigments in the 19th cen-
tury, which enabled the materialisation of exact primaries, were of the outmost 
importance. 
However, what about the educational lesson concerning the function of 
painters’ primary colours? Obviously, Rembrandt painted successfully enough 
with the chosen range of pigments. A general historical review of painters’ pal-
ettes enables reflection on which primary colours and paints he actually used 
(Gage, 1993, pp. 177-190). Rembrandt’s palette is a typical Dutch tonal palette of 
the time, with paints ranging from white, orange-red, yellow-ochre, cinnabar 
red, several browns to several blacks (Gage, 1993, p. 178, 184, colour plate no. 
145). There is almost no sign of blues, apart from some dark Prussian blue.
Obviously, Rembrandt’s range of painting pigments was also equivalent 
to RYB primaries; however, in this case these pigments, which were inadequate 
4  Because none of the material pigments can ever perfectly match the abstract exactness of 
primary colours, spectral defects occur when mixing primary pigments in practice. This means 
that in practice colour mixing of primaries does not result in colour mixtures (i.e., secondary 
colours) of the same intensity and saturation as should occur in theory. In theory—as is evident 
from colour wheels where secondary mixtures, like green, violet and orange, lie on the same 
circumference as primary colours—the intensity and saturation of primary and secondary 
colours should be the same.c e p s  Journal | Vol.1 | No2 | Year 2011 69
for colour printing, did their job well. Why is this so? What makes the differ-
ence? The reason lies in differentiating between the goals of printers’ and paint-
ers’ primaries. In contrast to printers, the painter’s goal is not the repeatable 
colour reproduction of an image, which must be multiplied infinitely, but a 
unique artwork that should not be repeated. Therefore, painters need not rely 
only on a limited and unchangeable range of primary colours, but can use a 
repertoire of all of those pigments that can help them achieve the desired ef-
fect. Because painters do not have to prevision the effect of a picture in terms 
of colour with the intention of reproducing it infinitely, they do need not to 
control the colour mixing process of pigments with axiomatic precision. Con-
sequently, for a painter colour mixing is not a strictly formalised and absolutely 
controllable process, but instead an intuitive and unpredictable creative flow, 
where spectral defects – a printers’ worst nightmare – are not deficiencies that 
have to be annulled but rather the desired source of a painting’s unpredictability 
and uniqueness, which can give the painting the mystic charm of being born 
uncontrollably. Thus, painters do not need to rely on exact primaries but can get 
along with approximate primaries just fine.
Modelling hypothetical Rembrandt can thus make a student of art expe-
rience that while pigment equivalents of RYB primaries were useless for print-
ing, since printing demands a limited and fixed range of pigments, they func-
tioned just fine in painting, where one can rely on a changeable and variable 
range of pigments.
The educational relevance of the two constructed hypothetical artwork 
models can be summed up as follows. Because these two hypothetical artworks 
draw attention to the essential difference in printers’ and painters’ primary col-
ours, they can make a student of art experience that when evaluating the cor-
rectness of artistic colour theories, such as the theories of Goethe, Itten, Kan-
dinsky, Klee and Albers, one cannot follow a strict division into theory and 
history of theory, for if one does so one must reject as wrong artworks that are 
in themselves entirely correct. Because printers were, due to the economic re-
quirement of reproducibility, always preoccupied with the axiomatic problem 
of deriving complete colour perception from as few paints as possible, for them 
the principles of colour mixing discovered by developing science were of the 
utmost importance. On the other hand, painters at the beginning of 20th cen-
tury did not need to share such enthusiasm about the newly discovered CMY 
primaries; instead, they could legitimately hold on to RYB primaries, which 
had a special historical and experiential value for them. Whereas printers must 
axiomatically derive complete colour perception from as few paints as possible, 
since they have to achieve the same result in each colour print, painters can 70 hypothetical art and art education
adjust their pallets to the uniqueness of the painting they are creating. Conse-
quently, also in painters’ colour theories, which are rooted in painting practice 
and tradition, primary colours need not be fully subordinated to the axiomatic 
formalism of colour mixing, but should instead be seen more as practical ap-
proximations of colour mixing as an intuitive and rather unpredictable creative 
process. Thus, painters’ primary colours should not be understood as axioms, 
but more as symbols—a kind of »holy trinity«—with the emphasis on their 
intense cultural significance (e.g., primary colours as a symbol of the Holy Trin-
ity in Christianity), material significance (e.g., the different economic values of 
colour pigments; the spectral particularities of different colour pigments, etc.) 
and experiential significance (the different »moral« value of different colour 
pigments).
Conclusion: The Educational Value of Hypothetical 
(Art) Experience
By the use of the method of hypothetical artwork modelling with regard to 
the example of the painters’ primary colours fallacy I have tried to demonstrate 
hypothetical art’s explicatory abilities, which can also be put to good use in 
the process of art education. I see its crucial explicatory, and thus also educa-
tional, advantage in attracting the student of art to become fictionally involved 
in the process of hypothetical artwork creation, thus giving him or her more of 
an experiential understanding of the art theoretical problems that accompany 
the process of creation of a real artwork. The usage of hypothetical art in art 
education can consequently transform art theoretical learning into a kind of 
experiential learning, since it enables the student to develop hypothetical expe-
rience, which can activate personal involvement and lived experience. When 
such hypothetical experience is gained, a student can reflect on and learn about 
the considered art issue in a more reasonable and realistic manner. This, how-
ever, prevents student’s knowledge from losing its way in the anomalies and 
theoretical chimaeras that usually arise due to a lack of concrete and personal 
experience of problem solving in reality.c e p s  Journal | Vol.1 | No2 | Year 2011 71
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